Investigation of the Role of Feminism and Perspectives about Gender Equality

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Abstract

Feminism is a movement towards equal society for male, female and transgender people, without discrimination. People should not feel discriminated against for being who they are. Hence, new thoughts formed on the lap of another and help women to create the idea of a gender perspective to change the situation and its constituency. In fact, some countries such as Catholic countries and some developing countries had also witnessed the rise of the feminist movement. Today, anti-feminism (especially radical and perverted feminists) is widespread in the world, too. This movement should be done by the women's fight and it seems is more effective. Feminism involves political and sociological theories and philosophies concerned with issues of gender difference, as well as a movement that advocates gender equality for women and campaigns for women's rights and interests. In this paper, the researcher discussed to the importance of feminism and gender equality.

Keywords: Feminism in criticize, Feminism perspectives, Gender Equality.
1-Introduction
Many feminists believe that religions consider womanhood “less than” manhood and encourage women to be submissive (McElroy, 2005). Thus, it has been posited that women fare better in the atheist community because of the greater belief in gender equality (Kirkley, 2000). Yet historical analysis (Kirkley, 2000) and present-day news (McCreight, 2011) suggest the dichotomous belief that religion is “bad” for women and atheism is “good” for women is an oversimplification of complex ideas that must be explored in greater depth. Feminism is not the belief that one gender should be raised in power above another. The very definition of feminism shows a complete opposition to this belief. So when people comment against feminism, they are supporting sexism. There is no sitting on the fence. You are either a feminist or sexist. Unfortunately, most sexists don’t know they are sexist, and compose the majority of the population. They are unaware that sexism is something that has been forced on to them through the brainwashed media of a patriarchal society. Another meaning for the term feminism is shed the word on social movements. Trying to believing the above - mentioned in the first sense - the institute. In Persian equivalent of feminist meaning of the term to be placed "women's movement" or "Movement for Liberation of Women". McAtamney(2015)
Several female scholars have attempted to examine the tension between religion and feminism. For example, Christine Overall (2007) explored potential counterarguments to the belief that religion is harmful to women. However, in her final analysis Overall concluded that several moral and philosophical reasons support the position that feminists should be atheists because there were no justifiable arguments to the contrary. Wendy McElroy (2005) provided a possible counterargument to Overall’s (2007) claims. McElroy contended there is no inherent tension between feminism and religion. She provided as an example the U.S. feminist movement that sprang from the abolitionist movement of the 1830s – a movement that was dominated with Quaker women. These women, who argued for both the end of slavery and the rights of women, were driven by religious conviction
The diversity of opinions and ideas and different tendencies that exist among feminists thought let us to know that feminism as an approach not a school and this point has led a group of thinkers instead of using the word "feminism" is used the word "feminism" .(Burke ,1990).It can be claimed that any movement of currents of thought which has two above features, a feminist movement and flow. In other words, the current thinking in all its forms based on humanism, "nuclear family" the man insists that the management and supervision of attacks and called for the dismantling of all sexual differences in opportunity, rights and opportunities, etc. Which eventually led to the rupture of the family, moral corruption and others. (Revagh Thought Journal . No. 28, 1)

1-1-History of Feminism:
Essentially background feminist perspectives in the West dates back to the second half of the seventeenth century and early eighteenth century and it was analysis writers of the Enlightenment Europe because it is human nature in the context of "speculative wisdom bourgeois" and put the basis of our analysis atomistic concept of "person". Excessive and inappropriate approach to the education of men and women alike and the same social roles for the sexes suggests that women are not compatible with human nature. Thus, historically, the feminist movement is divided into two stages: Firstly, began from the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century (1870- 1920) and secondly - after the recession 40 years - in decades (1970- 1960) was initiated and continued until the present. (Rezvani,2008 ,37)
They should be able to live in peace, without fear of not conforming to the “social norm.” We need to change the social norm. We need to move towards a society where men are not afraid to be vulnerable and women are allowed to be independent; a society where being male or female has no impact on how a person lives their life; a society where the pressure is off and everyone can be themselves.

Feminists in the first period, i.e., the old feminist had limited and clear goals. On the contrary, as supporters of the new feminist "women's liberation movement." organized and do not have a set targets and therefore not limit their goals. So both stages got their views of political philosophy in the dominant intellectual movement of time. Feminist Perspectives is first period of the second period of the ideas of liberalism and the New Left (Neo-Marxism).

The followers of this movement pursued in the first stage of its objectives in terms of social structure - political capitalism and Christianity and called the people from the political, legal and business with men. During this period, bourgeois feminism emerged in protest against the patriarchy. In the second step, the initial condition for the achievement of equality between women and men are restructured society. (Vincent,2008) The term feminism can be used to describe a political, cultural or economic movement aimed at establishing equal rights and legal protection for women. Although the terms “feminism” and “feminist” did not gain widespread use until the 1970s, they were already being used in the public parlance much earlier; for instance, Katherine Hepburn speaks of the "feminist movement" in the 1942 film Woman of the Year. (Ray,2008,93)

Feminism is an interdisciplinary approach to issues of equality and equity based on gender, gender expression, gender identity, sex, and sexuality as understood through social theories and political activism. Historically, feminism has evolved from the critical examination of inequality between the sexes to a more nuanced focus on the social and performative constructions of gender and sexuality.

According to Maggie Humm and Rebecca Walker, the history of feminism can be divided into three waves. The first feminist wave was in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the second was in the 1960s and 1970s, and the third extends from the 1990s to the present. Feminist theory emerged from these feminist movements. It is manifest in a variety of disciplines such as feminist geography, feminist history and feminist literary criticism.

Feminism has altered predominant perspectives in a wide range of areas within Western society, ranging from culture to law. Feminist activists have campaigned for women's legal rights (rights of contract, property rights, voting rights); for women's right to bodily integrity and autonomy, for abortion rights, and for reproductive rights (including access to contraception and quality prenatal care); for protection of women and girls from domestic violence, sexual harassment and rape; for workplace rights, including maternity leave and equal pay; against misogyny; and against other forms of gender-specific discrimination against women.

During much of its history, most feminist movements and theories had leaders who were predominantly middle-class white women from Western Europe and North America. However, at least since Sojourner Truth's 1851 speech to American feminists, women of other races have proposed alternative feminisms. This trend accelerated in the 1960s with the Civil Rights movement in the United States and the collapse of European colonialism in Africa, the
Caribbean, parts of Latin America and Southeast Asia. Since that time, women in former European colonies and the Third World have proposed "Post-colonial" and "Third World" feminisms. Some Postcolonial Feminists, such as Chandra Talpade Mohanty, are critical of Western feminism for being ethnocentric. Black feminists, such as Angela Davis and Alice Walker, share this view.

-Feminism in criticize balance

Modern Western philosophy's regnant conceptions of the self minimize the personal and ethical import of unchosen circumstances and interpersonal relationships. They eclipse family, friendship, passionate love, and community, and they reinforce a modern binary that divides the social sphere into autonomous agents and their dependents. While women are no longer classified as defective selves, the caregiving responsibilities that once defined their status as dependents on male heads of households continue to place a special burden on women for labor that is devalued in society. (Al-Mizan, p33). Prevailing conceptions of the self ignore the multiple, sometimes fractious sources of social identity constituted at the intersections of one's gender, sexual orientation, race, class, age, ethnicity, and so forth. Structural domination and subordination are thought not to penetrate the "inner citadel" of selfhood. Likewise, these conceptions deny the complexity of the dynamic, intrapsychic world of unconscious fantasies, fears, and desires, and they overlook the ways in which such materials intrude upon conscious life.

Feminist critics point out, furthermore, that this misogynist heritage cannot be remedied simply by condemning these traditional constraints and advocating equal rights for women. Rather, these very conceptions of the self are gendered. In western culture, the mind and reason are coded masculine, whereas the body and emotion are coded feminine. To identify the self with the rational mind is, then, to masculinize the self. If selfhood is not impossible for women, it is only because they resemble men in certain essential respects—they are not altogether devoid of rational will. (Irigaray 1985b; Lloyd 1992).

The nullification of women's selfhood was once explicitly codified in Anglo-European and American law. The legal doctrine of coverture held that a woman's personhood was absorbed into that of her husband when she married. Assuming her husband's surname symbolizes this denial of the wife's separate identity. In addition, coverture deprived the wife of her right to bodily integrity, for rape within marriage was not recognized as a crime, nor was it illegal for a husband to beat his wife. She lost her right to property, as well, for her husband was entitled to control her earnings, and she was barred from making contracts in her own name. Lacking the right to vote or to serve on juries, she was a second-class citizen whose enfranchised husband purportedly represented her politically. (McDonagh 1996).

Although coverture has been rescinded, vestiges of this denial of women's selfhood can be discerned in recent legal rulings and in contemporary culture. For example, pregnant women remain vulnerable to legally sanctioned violations of their right to bodily integrity and legal autonomy, often unavoidably if they lack race and class privilege (Brown 1998). Courts have forced pregnant women to submit to invasive medical procedures for the sake of the fetuses they were carrying, although no court would compel any other woman or man to undergo comparable procedures for the sake of a living individual, including a family member (Bordo 1993).
Feminists object that this philosophical consolidation of the preeminence of the masculine over the feminine rests on untenable assumptions about the transparency of the self, the immunity of the self to social influences, and the reliability of reason as a corrective to distorted moral judgment. People grow up in social environments saturated with culturally normative prejudice and implicit biases, even in communities where overt forms of bigotry are strictly proscribed (Meyers 1994).

As a result, people often consider themselves objective and fair, and yet they systematically discriminate against “different” others while favoring members of their own social group (Piper 1990; Young 1990). Fortified by culture and ensconced in the unconscious, such prejudice cannot be dispelled through rational reflection alone (Meyers 1994). In effect, then, the Kantian construct countenances “innocent” wrongdoing and occluded reinforcement of the social stratification that privileges an elite whom this conception takes as paradigmatic.

Another strand of feminist critique targets homo economics' preoccupation with independence and planning. In an eerie suspension of biological reality, utilitarian selves are conceived as sufficient unto themselves. Challenging patriarchal culture's homo economics together with the anti-biological, individualist strain in Beauvoir's feminism, feminist thinkers such as Irigaray have turned philosophical attention to the mother-child dyad. In dominant conceptions of the self, no one seems to be born and raised, for birth mothers and caregivers are driven offstage (LaChance Adams and Lundquist 2012).

A further problem with the traditional modernist view from a feminist standpoint is that it fails to furnish an adequate account of internalized oppression and the process of overcoming it. It is common for women to comport themselves in a feminine fashion, to scale down their aspirations, and to embrace gender-compliant goals (Irigaray 1985a; Bartky 1990; Babbitt 1993; Cudd 2006; Beauvoir 2011).

Feminists account for this phenomenon by explaining that women internalize patriarchal values and norms—that is, these pernicious values and norms become integrated in the cognitive, emotional, and conative structure of the self. Women may contribute to their own oppression without realizing it. Once embedded in a woman's psychic economy, internalized oppression conditions her desires. To maximize satisfaction of her desires, then, would be to collaborate in her own oppression. Paradoxically, the more completely she fulfills these desires, the worse off she becomes. Advantaged as he is, homo economics can safely accept his desires as given and proceed without ado to orchestrate a plan to satisfy them. But women and members of other subordinated groups can ill-afford such complacency, and homo economics' instrumental reason is too superficial to serve their interests (Irigaray 1985a; Babbitt 1993).

Feminist critique exposes the partiality of the ostensibly universal Kantian ethical subject and homo economics. These conceptions of the self are: 1) androcentric because they replicate masculine stereotypes and ideals; 2) sexist because they demean anything that smacks of the feminine; 3) masculinist because they help to perpetuate male dominance; and 4) elitist because they perpetuate other associated biases, including heterosexist, transphobic, racist, ethnocentric, ablest, classist, and, arguably, speciesism biases (Willett 2014).
Feminist critiques, we have seen, accuse regnant philosophical accounts of masculinizing the self. One corollary of this masculinized view of selfhood is that women are consigned to selflessness—that is, to invisibility, subservient passivity, and self-sacrificial altruism. These traditional images have a long history and remain salient today in reductive views of the maternal as the central axis of female identity.

A tension within feminism complicates the project of reclaiming women's selfhood, however. The claim that women are systematically subordinated and that this subordination has a grievous impact on women's lives is central to feminism. Yet, this key insight seems to belie the claim that women's selfhood and agency have been overlooked. To be unjustly subordinated, it would seem, is to be diminished in one's selfhood and to have one's agency curtailed. Otherwise, what's the harm? Addressing this paradox requires challenging “master narratives” and traditional canons of philosophy, through turning toward “slave narratives” and other subversive philosophical cultures for alternative views of identity and selfhood (Willett 1995) and through reasserting the identity of women in manners that transform stereotypes into liberating modes of selfhood.

Yet apart from such challenges to the master narratives and classical binaries, feminists may risk perpetuating derogatory views of women as victims and men as agents. Arguing that moral virtues truly have no gender, Mary Wollstonecraft regards “feminine” virtues as perversions of these true virtues and laments women's conscription into a bogus ideal (Wollstonecraft 1792). Similarly but more vividly, Simone de Beauvoir labels women “mutilated” and “immanent” (Beauvoir 2011).

The conventional view of pregnancy and birth classifies them as merely biological processes, while the conventional view of mothering classifies it as a merely instinctual activity. Feminists demonstrate that these assessments are sorely mistaken. Revaluing the significance of the mother and the early social bond have produced two overlapping philosophical approaches: an ethics of care (Lindemann 2014). While the care tradition grows out of a critical engagement with Anglo-American analytic and pragmatist philosophical traditions, the eros tradition draws centrally from Africana (including African American pragmatist), Continental, and other sources. Both traditions emphasize that pregnancy and giving birth engage women's agential powers.

Like feminists who have reclaimed women's agency as mothers, feminists who have developed versions of relational ethics insist on taking women's experience seriously and use this experience as a basis for new approaches to social ethics and public policy. The aim of the psychological studies that first made the voice of care audible was to recognize and understand the capacities for moral judgment of women whose competency had been underrated. Previous research comparing boys' and girls' moral development had concluded that girls' development was stunted, but Carol Gilligan argues that this assessment misconstrued the data (Gilligan 1982).

According to Gilligan, there are two paths of moral development: justice and care. Many girls and women but almost no men follow the care trajectory (Gilligan 1987). Since earlier investigations first studied U.S. boys and men and used these interviews to generalize about people's moral development, researchers noticed only one path, namely, the justice trajectory. By repudiating the assumption that the masculine is the human norm and by studying girls...
and women, Gilligan discovered an alternative mode of moral cognition—the Care Perspective. Constituted by a distinctive set of framing concepts and a distinctive set of reflective skills, the morality of care is not translatable into the morality of justice that Gilligan's predecessors had taken to be the gauge of moral development.

Although a number of feminist philosophers criticize Gilligan's investigations on empirical or philosophical grounds (Fraser and Nicholson 1990; Moody-Adams 1991; Friedman 1993), her research prompted a number of feminist philosophers to develop social ethics perspectives marked by quite different emphases from those of traditional moral theories.

The theme of human interconnectedness and the value of intersubjectivity are prominent in contemporary feminist ethics. In Anglo-American care traditions, emphasis is placed on a climate of trust that forms an indispensable background for all sorts of undertakings; no voluntarist ethic can account for such trust (Baier 1986).

In light of the history of figuring women as driven by their reproductive biology and in need of rational male guidance, as well as the history of women's enforced economic dependence on men or relegation to poorly paid or abject forms of labor, feminists can hardly ignore the topic of self-determination. Thus, a number of feminist philosophers take up this challenge and present accounts of autonomy that do not devalue the interpersonal capacities and social contributions that are conventionally coded feminine (Nedelsky 1989; Meyers 1989 and 2000; Benhabib 1995 and 1999; Weir 1995).

Whereas standard modernist accounts of autonomy stress rational decision making and valorize a respect for rights, feminist accounts accent the role of feelings in autonomous lives (Nedelsky 1989; Meyers 1989; Weir 1995) and focus on the way that subordination constrains autonomy (Meyers 1989; Babbitt 1993; Benhabib 1995; Cudd 2006).

Feminist accounts stress the autonomous individual's need for constructive feedback, advice, and encouragement from others (Meyers 1989; Brison 1997). A feminist view opens the space for considering autonomy an ongoing and improvisational process of exercising self-discovery, self-definition, and self-direction, rather than endorsing a set of desires and goals chosen exclusively by the individual (Meyers 1989 and 2000). While standard accounts see autonomy as an all-or-nothing achievement, feminist accounts note how autonomy skills piggyback on seemingly unrelated ancillary skills, how autonomy skills may be exercised in certain contexts yet deactivated in others, and how different degrees of skillfulness yield varying degrees of autonomy (Meyers 1989; Friedman 1993).

Such feminist versions of autonomy strike a balance between recognizing the injury that subordination does to women's sense of self and agency and respecting the measure of autonomy women gain despite this subjugation (Cudd 2006). Subordination endangers women's autonomy in a number of ways. Not only does internalized oppression mold women's desires and alienate them from themselves; it also offers those in subordinate positions all sorts of incentives to minimize friction and ease their lot by placating those with power (Card 1996).
Still, feminist accounts of autonomy enable us to understand why women do not completely lack autonomy and how women's autonomy can be augmented. The self-discovery, self-definition, and self-direction skills that secure autonomy are commonplace (Meyers 1989).

Other feminists propose alternatives that are orthogonal to the autonomy/dependency binary undergirding Anglo-American and European modernism. Nkiru emphasizes the value of dialogue over monologist styles of narrative self-understanding and alternative non-Western models of thinking and selfhood (Nzegwu 2006). She develops one such alternative model by staging a fictional conversation between Beauvoir and Nigerian Igbo thinkers on the maternal ethos of the consanguine, woman-woman, matrilineal, and dual-descent families with striking implications. In these contexts, a relational identity of the self ‘emerges in an intricate network of family, societal, and organizational ties.

Moreover, in these alternative and often emancipatory accounts of an erotic self, the trajectory of self-development may vary from prevalent Western views. The latter conceptions of self-identity commonly invoke a tale of early dependency upon the family and the eventual achievement of autonomy through narratives of separation and virtues of independence and self-determination. Alternative traditions of maturation may feature instead a multiplicity of social roles, practices, and connections. Patricia Hill Collins offers glimpses into an ethics of interconnectivity as an eros ethics in her characterization of the fluidity of “other mothers” for African American communities (Collins 1990). For this tradition, she cites Audre Lorde's distinct rendering of the term 'eros'. The erotic charge of the self is not primarily sexual nor narrowly maternal, but is the energy and drive that oppressive systems attempt to appropriate and that creative, life-giving social practices regenerate. Rather than striving for autonomy from these practices, these thinkers seek ways to grow in their sense of power through counter-traditions and alternative, emancipatory cultures and communities.

To understanding what Irizarry offers for a feminist philosophy of the self, it is important to dispel the specter of ‘essentialism’ that beset feminist debates in the 1990s and continues to have effects today. Irizarry and fellow feminists writing in French around the same period (especially Julia Kristeva and Hélène Cixous) have sometimes been criticized for their emphasis on the body, particularly on women's organs (Sayers 1986; Poovey 1988).

Feminist philosophers have noted strengths and weaknesses in both of these views. For example, Kristeva's questionable-subject-in-process seems to enshrine and endorse the very gender dichotomy that causes women so much grief. The association of the mother with the unruly and ambiguous semiotic may obscure the rich affect attunement and preverbal dialogues between (male and female) caregivers and their already socially-oriented infants (Willett 1995).

By and large, much of recent feminist philosophy of the self troubles the autonomy model, typically by introducing psychodynamic and relational features. Interpretations of Kristeva develop her views further by expanding up the relational self as a capacity for a loving sense of “response-ability” to otherness and difference (Oliver 1998). Kelly Oliver’s post-Levinasian approach emphasizes the radical exteriority of the other to the self, locating the origin or prompt for the self from this radical exteriority. Oliver uses the motif of witnessing to explore the ways in which the othering can be acknowledged but not known.
On the other hand, some contemporary feminist philosophers express concern that the sorts of conceptions sketched above are detrimental to feminist aims (Benhabib 1995). Still, feminists have moved psychoanalytic theories, object relations theories, and poststructuralism forward to introduce new conceptions of the relational self as not only embodied, psycho-dynamic, and social, but also intersectional and multilayered.

2-Discussion

As this article attests, there is tremendous foment and variety within the field of feminist work on the self. Yet, in reviewing this literature, we have been struck by a recurrent theme—the inextricability of metaphysical issues about the self from moral and political theory. Feminist critiques of regnant philosophical theories of the self expose the normative underpinnings of these theories. Feminist analyses of women's agential capacities both acknowledge traditional feminine social contributions and provide accounts of how women can overcome oppressive norms and practices.

Feminist reconstructions of the nature of the self are interwoven with arguments that draw out the emancipatory benefits of conceiving the self one way rather than another. There is nothing surprising, to be sure, about the salience of normative concerns in feminist philosophizing. Still, we mention it because we believe that feminists' attention to political concerns leads to fresh questions that enrich the philosophical understanding of the self. Moreover, we would urge that this forthrightness about the political viewpoint that informs philosophy is a virtue, for overlooking the political suppositions and implications of esoteric philosophical views has led to considerable mischief. It is precisely the failure to acknowledge that the question of the self is not narrowly metaphysical that has led to philosophy's implicit modeling of the self on a male subject, a tendency that feminist perspectives on the self seek to remediate. Feminist political activists campaign in areas such as reproductive rights, domestic violence, fairness, social justice, and workplace issues such as family medical leave, equal pay, and sexual harassment and discrimination.

-Gender differences between Islam and feminism(Comparative gender rights in Islam and feminism)

Regarding whether sex differences in women's rights, the most important difference between Islam and feminism. Spirit of the difference between the ontological and epistemological foundations of both schools becomes apparent, it is rooted in the best interests of the Who determined.

Islam requires that enterprise to the Almighty, but human feminism decisive knows his interests. Thus, in Islam, justice is a reality noumen, but feminism, justice is a relative thing and quite different in terms of human experience, it also means change. About sex differences between men and women, there are two diametrically opposed views:

According to one view, the legal difference represents oppression and discrimination against women because justice means full respect for equality between men and women and any difference is trampling justice, but in terms of approach, absolute identification of opens the way for injustices against women because ignoring the natural differences between women and assimilate it with the opposite sex is considered a type of sexual oppression because
according to it, not only "self" is lost, but the men of his own makes sense. Differences between the two approaches arising from two completely different mindset that their understanding requires a systematic understanding of meaning, epistemological and ontological each one according to which the cause of the disorder is to be understood and followed by the judgment.

Feminism consists of ideas and beliefs about what culture is like for women just because they are women, compared to what the world is like for men just because they are men. In ethical terms, this form or aspect of feminism is descriptive. The assumption in feminism is that women are not treated equally to men, and that women are disadvantaged in comparison to men.

-Legal differences of philosophy in Islam

Some feminists believe that gender should not be a difference in gender. According to this approach, "femininity" and "masculinity" are not inherent feature, absolute and beyond time and space but also social and cultural issues and made specific historical and is considered economic conditions.

But the view faded in the second wave. Some of the traditional characteristics attributed to women will have a positive value. (Ray Vilford, feminism, feminism reference Bulletin, p. 32)

According to Islamic approach, equality of women and men, in the sight of God is the one their values and do not have any advantages on different structures and it is necessary for legal differences. As a result of unification of law, equal consideration in their nature is a great injustice but in feminism is equality, not similarity and equality of men and women find each direction. It thus appears that the application draws on these two approaches is merely verbal Share. The result is that both Islam and feminism is intended women's rights. (The Holy Qur'an).

In Islam, what is genuine is man special rights or special rights, not women but human rights concern in the light of the human relationship is more beautiful drawing. In this respect, not domination is sent, not submissive, not superior nor inferior because everyone is in his place and accordingly will benefit from their rights. This type of relationship that necessarily entails differences, it is necessary for the survival of society. (Hassani Seyede Masoumeh, 23)

There are several considerations about different trends in feminism. Feminist critiques of the two species:

A) notes that regardless of accepting Islam and the divine principles can be cited or mentioned.

B) objections that due to religious thought, anybody found the equality of men and women

3-Conclusion

Feminist theory now aims to interrogate inequalities and inequities along the intersectional lines of ability, class, gender, race, sex, and sexuality, and feminists seek to effect change in areas where these intersectional ties create power inequity. Intellectual and academic discussion of these inequities allows our students to go into the world aware of injustices and to work toward changing unhealthy dynamics in any scenario.
As a result, feminists have not merely perceived the self as a metaphysical issue but have also drawn attention to its ethical, epistemological, social, and political imbrication. Responding to this state of affairs, feminist philosophical work on the self has taken three main tacks: (1) critiques of dominant modern, Western views of the self, (2) reclaims of female identities, and (3) reconceptualization of the self as both (a) a dynamic, relational individual beholden to unconscious desires and social bonds and (b) an intersectional, multilayered phenomenon. The feminist reconceptualization of the self have in turn not only challenged standard philosophical models for their biases but also shifted the center of the discipline toward multilayered models of the relational self. This entry will survey both critical and reconstructive feminist approaches to the self. (Eshaghi, 2010,p14)

Indeed, some of them, such as introspective attunement to feelings and receptiveness to others' feedback, are gender-compatible for and often promoted in women. Although others, such as rational planning and self-assertion, are coded masculine, many women in fact have considerable proficiency in these areas. An early feminist who aimed to revise traditional, implicitly masculinist, autonomy with a conception of freedom that incorporated women's experience was Beauvoir. Along with fellow existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre, Beauvoir characterized human experience in terms of 'immanence,' or one's embeddedness within one's historic-cultural, as well as personal, situation, and 'transcendence,' or one's radical freedom with respect to one's choices and future. This dual nature of the human condition contests the radical independence of the rational subject of Kantian autonomy or homo economics by placing ambiguity at the heart of human experience. While both men and women are immanent and transcendent on an existentialist view, Beauvoir claims that women have been overwhelmingly associated with immanence and thus have not been encouraged to claim their own freedom (Beauvoir 2011). Their selves are determined by their situations and contexts--what biology and others claim them to be--and they have been prevented from taking up their own lives as projects. Beauvoir, then, is in line with feminists' reclamation of autonomy (something for which other feminists have often critiqued her, associating this reclamation with a reversion to the masculine ideal of independence), although this reclamation is not at the expense of acknowledging women's determination by their socio-cultural and personal landscape. For Beauvoir, 'women' is a category imposed by society; women's selves, then, are also in large part imposed on them by society, and on her view women would do well to take hold of their claims to freedom and choice and thus reclaim their freedom and selfhood.
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