

British military operation at Sheikh Sa'id in the First World War

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Abstract

It is a difficult task to measure the importance of South West Arabia to the Ottomans and the British prior to and during World War I. Early history of imperial expansion in the area which followed by constant conflicts and involved a considerable amount of diplomacy and intrigues with the natives may suggest that South West Arabia was considered as equally as important to other areas within the empire. However from the beginning of the 20th century South West Arabia was considered something of a backwater. It may also be observed that during the First World War the position of South West Arabia to these powers in relation to other war theatres remained practically the same except in the episodes of British action at Sheikh Said and the Ottomans advance at Lahej. The Indian authorities who believed that the Ottomans were contemplating a move to Sheikh Sa'id with the aim of acting against British Perim with the telegraphic communication, convoys and shipping, only two miles away, took the opportunity of the movement of the troops through the Red Sea to attack the fort of Sheikh Sa'id. The action was quickly taken before obtaining official approval from the Admiralty and the India Office in London. The action was taken due to the persistent reports of the Ottoman reinforcement with guns had been sent to Sheikh Sa'id, further to take advantage of the presence of transports with troops for Egypt. Subsequently future military operations at Sheikh Sa'id and the Red Sea appeared to dominate the discussions among the authorities at the India Office, the Admiralty, the Indian authorities and the Resident at Aden throughout the war without materializing any further military action.

Keywords: The British, the Ottoman, military operation, Sheikh Sa'id and Aden.

Introduction

Prior to the outbreak of the First World War, the Imperial Powers, the Ottomans and the British had officially settled their boundary disputes in the Yemen notably after the Anglo-Turkish Boundary Commission was ratified on March 18, 1914. The ratification of the boundary indicated that both imperial governments were prepared to accept their early arrangements on the limit of their sphere of influence in the Yemen. The British under the new Liberal Government adopted in 1906 a policy of non-intervention in the Aden Protectorate, placing upon London and Istanbul direct and greater responsibilities for settling future dispute in a friendly atmosphere. Coincidentally, the Ottomans, under the Young Turks also moved in the same direction, when they prepared in 1913 to recognize the autonomy of the Zaidi Imam in the Yemen highlands in accordance to the Treaty of *Da'an* dated 1911.

The Treaty of *Da'an* put an end to the maintenance of mass Ottoman forces in the Yemen. Since then the Ottomans depended mainly upon the 7th army corps stationed in the *vilayet* of Yemen and were located at Sana'a to confront the rebellious tribe of Zaraniq in the Tihamah and the Idrisi in Asir. As regards the British, the policy of non-intervention in the Aden Protectorate had ended any attempt to extend their sphere of influence beyond the border. Within the border they were further restricted from interfering with tribal affairs. In addition they was the withdrawal of the Political Officer and troops from Dali'. Long before the outbreak of the First World War, both the Imperial Powers had limited their activities in South West Arabia, a place of no less strategic interest to either party.

At the beginning of the First World War, the British had no accurate information on the strength of the Ottoman forces in South Arabia. The Romanian Military attaché at Istanbul reported in December 1914 that the total strength of the Ottoman forces was thirty-three battalions (between 13,000 to 16,000 men). (L/MIL/17/5/3955, War Diary, 21/1/1915.) Later estimate furnished to the Admiralty that the Ottoman strength was about 37,000 men. (Adm 137, 31/12/14.) Another estimate provided by Major Bradshaw, General Staff Officer at Aden that the strength was 15,000 men. (L/MIL/17/5/3957, War Diary, 20/3/15.) Jacob concluded that the strength of the 7th army corps at about 35 battalions, numbering about 14,000 men. (Jacob, 1923: p.168.)

On the other hand, the number of the British forces at Aden was comparatively small, two infantry Battalions, (a British and an Indian), three companies of the Royal Garrison Artillery, the 23rd (Fortress) Company of the Bombay Sappers and Miners and the Aden Troop of one hundred sabres. (Bidwell, 1982. pp.171) Early in August 1914, the Aden Brigade numbered only 1081 British troops and 1055 Indian troops. (L/MIL/17/15/1198, 1/8/1914.) Early in November 1914, 23rd Sikh Pioneers were sent to Aden for reinforcement which increased the strength of the Indian troops to 1974 men. The existing British battalion, the Lancashire Fusiliers, was replaced in December 1914 by the Brecknockshire Battalion of the South Wales Borderers, which raised their number only to 1188 men. (L/MIL/17/15/3954, War Diary, 16/12/14.) Thus the total strength of the British forces at Aden was a little over 3,000 in contrast with 14,000 to 15,000 of the Ottomans in the Yemen. It was not surprising therefore that

throughout the war requests for reinforcement were frequently made by the Aden authority for defensive and offensive measures in the area.

British military operation at Sheikh Sa'id

The Ottoman Government did not officially enter the war on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary against the Allies until November 5, 1914. But the British suspected the Ottoman intention to join the war when in September that year it was reported that the Ottoman troops were secretly concentrating near the Egyptian border. The following month saw reports of the concentration of the Ottoman troops in Syria, Palestine and Arabia.

Early in October, the Assistant Resident reported at Perim that two Ottoman officers had arrived at Manhali (Manhali and Turba were two Ottoman forts at Sheikh Sa'id) to inspect fort Sheikh Sa'id opposite Perim, a British island in the Red Sea with cable installations, coaling depot and lighthouse. Meanwhile another source which brought news from Hudaydah indicated preparations by the Ottomans for war and troops were being moved from Asir to Hudaydah and Jeddah. (L/P&S/10/558, 9/10/1914.) A further report from the Resident, Sir J. Bell showed that the Ottomans were also prepared to move to Yemen-Protectorate border with the aim to act against the Aden Protectorate, and to enlist the co-operation of the Arab tribes at the border. (L/P&S/10/558, 11/10/1914.) At the end of October, it was further reported that two Regiments of the Ottomans troops at Ta'iz with their military equipment and artillery were ready to proceed to Sheikh Sa'id. (R/20/A/1319, 24/10/1914.)

The above reports might have provided the Indian authorities with proofs of the validity of their belief that the Ottomans were contemplating a move to Sheikh Sa'id with the aim of acting against Perim in the Red Sea at the entrance of the Ottomans into the First World War. Even before the Ottomans officially entered the war, the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, suggested on September 4, 1914 to occupy Sheikh Sa'id for the safety of Perim and the Red Sea.

Following the reports of the preparation of the Ottomans at Sheikh Sa'id, the Indian authorities secretly planned to destroy them. This was in order to avoid any possible interference with the British telegraphic communication, convoys and shipping at Perim, only two miles away. The movement and the strength of the Ottoman troops in that area was cautiously watched by the Indian authorities, and information on landing places at Sheikh Sa'id was immediately requested from the Resident for the purpose of attacking the place. (L/MIL/17/5/4056, War Diary, 23/10/1914.)

In the meantime it had been decided by London that should the Ottomans enter the war against the Allies, the policy would be that the Government should avoid action against any ports in the Red Sea in an attempt to gain the co-operation of the Arab chiefs, notably the Zaidi Imam and the Idrisi, against the Ottomans. The Indian authorities were aware of the policy and on November 4 such instructions were sent to India (L/P&S/10/558, 4/11/1914) but, as will be shown, they were ignored.

The Indian authorities, however, took the opportunity of the movement of the troops through the Red Sea to attack the fort of Sheikh Sa'id. The action was quickly taken before obtaining official approval from the Admiralty in London. The Viceroy presumably might have thought that action in the Red Sea was still within his discretion. Therefore, as early as November 3, 1914 orders were sent to General H.V. Cox, commanding the 29th Brigade, to seize Sheikh Sa'id on his way to Egypt. (L/MIL/15/4056, War Diary, 3/11/1914.) The following day the orders were amplified as follows:

“The operation is intended to capture Sheikh Said and to destroy the Turkish works, armaments and wells there. Reports indicate the Turkish forces at Sheikh Said number 500 men with 6 or 7 guns. The operation will be carried out by the following units of the 69th Punjabis, the 89th Punjabis, on Transports “City of Manchester” and “Edavana” accompanied by 23rd Pioneers on Transport “Nurani”. The whole under the command of Brigadier-General H.V. Cox. General Commanding Officer, Aden will detail his General Staff Officer, Major Bradshaw only on him and no other individual at Perim or Aden is to be informed of these orders. Sheikh Said will be evacuated after destruction of the Turkish works, armaments, and wells. Having re-embarked the troops of the 29th Brigade, the ships will then proceed to Egypt, the 23rd Pioneer on the “Nurani” will return to Aden”. (L/MIL/17/5/4056, War Diary, 4/11/1914.)

The proposed operation was secretly circulated in India and Aden. A copy was sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the East Indies, Bombay, Rear-Admiral Pierse to secure naval co-operation in the proposed operation, namely the assistance of the ship, “Duke of Edinburgh”. Another copy was sent to the Resident at Aden and reminded him not to disclose the plan to anyone but Bradshaw, for the purpose of providing detailed information of the operation. Only on November 5, was the Secretary of State, Crewe, informed of the plan when Hardinge, the Viceroy, telegraphed him privately that he had told the Commander-in-Chief that:

“In view of the fact that we know the Turks have been erecting some heavy guns at Sheikh Said, opposite Perim, it would be advisable, when transporting a regiment of troops from India to Aden, to take the opportunity for an escorting ship to bombard and destroy the guns, and for the Infantry regiment to land and to blow up the buildings and destroy the water-supply. It will have an excellent effect in that part of Arabia and will protect our telegraph station at Perim from attack”. (Hardinge Papers, 120, 5/11/1914.)

Crewe, however, did not discuss the proposed plan in his succeeding communications with Hardinge, nor did he consult the Admiralty, War Office or Foreign Office on the matter for their views. The Admiralty was also not informed by the Commander-in-Chief of East Indies, Rear-Admiral Pierse, when he agreed to co-operate with the Viceroy in the operation. On November 9, Pierse wired the Admiralty informing them of a plan for the movement of ships, including “Duke of Edinburgh”, to Suez but yet he did not mention the proposed operation at Sheikh Sa'id.

Only on November 11, when the action at Sheikh Sa'id had taken place, did Pierse inform the Admiralty of the involvement of “Duke of Edinburgh”, and this caused surprise

among the officials at the Admiralty. It seems that none of them knew of the operation and even Admiral Slade had insufficient knowledge to explain it. He remarked "I suppose this operation was carried out at the instance of the Resident at Aden. The initiation of operations in this region has been left to the Resident at the request of the India Office on account of the importance of securing the adherence of the Arabs. This fort is in the territory claimed by the Imam". (Adm 137/97, 11/11/1914.) At Aden, Jacob was duly not informed on the operation at Sheikh Sa'id. Not surprisingly he regarded the operation as folly for its main result was to irritate the Imam who resented it as an assault upon his territory. (Bidwell, 1982: p.172.)

Detailed operation at Sheikh Sa'id was finally disclosed. Initially on November 4, Brigadier-General Cox received orders from the Chief of the General Staff. At 11 pm November 6, Cox left for Aden with the Transport *Edavana* to enable him to pick up Major Bradshaw. The ship arrived at 5.30 pm November 8. Meanwhile at 6 pm November 8, "Duke of Edinburgh" with "City of Manchester" and "Nurani" left for Aden and arrived at Aden at 10 pm November 9. At 5 pm November 9, the convoy left Aden for Sheikh Sa'id and arrived there at 1.45 am November 10. At day-break the operation was carried out. (Adm 137/899, 14/11/1914.)

The news of the successful operation was officially telegraphed to London by Hardinge on November 11, stating that:

"We thought it desirable in consequence of persistent reports to the effect that Turkish reinforcement(s) with guns had been despatched to Sheikh Said, to take advantage of presence en route of transports with troops for Egypt, General Cox was accordingly instructed to land a small force to destroy the works there, afterwards continuing his journey. Sheikh Said is within artillery (range) of the Perim cable station and commands the eastern passage at Perim". (L/MIL/17/5/4056, War Diary, 11/11/1914.)

At the India Office, London, news of the operation at Sheikh Sa'id did not surprise the officials there, presumably they were informed earlier by Crewe. They, however, believed that the withdrawal from Sheikh Sa'id after the occupation was a mistake. The India Office favoured holding that place, and Admiral Slade had even suggested asking the Arabs to hold Sheikh Sa'id for the British, in an attempt to bring them into the British camp. (L/P&S/10/558, 18/11/1914.) On November 22, the India Office telegraphed the Viceroy suggesting the Resident should take steps in negotiating with the Arabs to hold Sheikh Sa'id on behalf of the British, but it was too late as Sheikh Sa'id was reported to have been reoccupied by the Arabs before the arrangement could be made. (L/P&S/10/558, 5/12/1914.)

As a result of the operation at Sheikh Sa'id, the Admiralty adopted a definite policy with regard to the naval operations in the Red Sea. On November 15, the First Lord of the Admiralty sent a letter to Sir Edward Grey at the Foreign Office, Lord Kitchener at the War Office and Lord Crewe at the India Office to obtain their views regarding the policy that all naval operations in the Red Sea should be concerted between the General Officer Commanding and Senior Naval Officer Egypt, and preventing the Government of India from issuing orders through the Admiral at Bombay. This was agreed, but Crewe added that his Office should be consulted, especially as regards Arab policy as well as Muslim sentiment. Accordingly on November 17, the Admiralty

telegraphed to the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies that “naval operation in the Red Sea and Egypt cannot be directed from India”. (Adm 137/97, 17/11/1914.)

Under the new arrangement control of operations in the Red Sea was now in the joint hands of the Admiralty and the General Officer Commanding, Egypt. This arrangement was initiated by the Admiralty in consequence of the events at Sheikh Sa‘id and agreed by the Foreign Office and the India Office though on conditions. Sir Beauchamp Duff, Commander-in-Chief, India informed Hardinge that he was not satisfied with the new arrangement. He argued that

“... it is true that India, or perhaps more correctly the Resident at Aden, is to be consulted before anything is done which affects Indian interests, but I do not like the position. It seems to me that Your Excellency will have no real control, and that things (can/may?) easily be done through ignorance which may involve us in the most serious trouble and make it imperative on us to try and pull them out of some mess at whatever risk to ourselves”. (Hardinge Papers, 120, 27/11/1914.)

It was not clear how far the Viceroy shared the views of the Commander-in-Chief concerning the new arrangement for the control of the Red Sea. Later evidence shows that the Viceroy had become a stumbling-block to the forward policy in the Red Sea proposed by London. Perhaps the new arrangement did not satisfy him as he always believed that any successful operation should be handed to the officials on the spot, and not be in the hands of the Home authorities.

As regards the Ottomans, the attack at Sheikh Sa‘id provided them with an opportunity for attempting to persuade the chiefs of the Aden Protectorate to co-operate with them on religious ground against the British. Jacob, acting political Resident wrote to warn the British Government that the bombardment of Sheikh Sa‘id by the British on November 10, had caused suspicion among the Arabs about British policy. Jacob reported that Shaykh Ahmad Nu‘man, the Ottoman official (*qa'immaqam*) of Hujariyah had written to the ‘Abdali Sultan saying that:

“... by their attack on Sheikh Said, the English had shown their desire to destroy Islam. Actuated by ties of my friendship towards you and bonds of Islamic brotherhood I write to ascertain your mind and to tell you that both Shafai and Zaidi tribesmen are collecting at the orders of the Turkish Government to defend their religion and country”. (L/P&S/10/558, 17/11/1914.)

Jacob suggested to announce a proclamation to the Ottoman Arab leaders declaring British inclination towards the Arabs, denying British desire for more territory, expressing surprise of the Arab friendship with the Turks, their real enemy, and warning them against violation of British territory. Jacob also suggested to include the Imam who had been apprehensive of the Christian designs on Islam and its territories. The India Office approved Jacob proposal and the following proclamation was issued:

“The British Government do not entertain any desire to extend the frontiers of their territory, and feel confident that Arabs will not league themselves with the Turks, who

are the real enemies of Arab progress and welfare, against English who are determined to maintain rights of Islam and respect holy places and who have invariably defended Arab interests. There must at the same time be no violation of British border. In the establishment of that peace and order which alone can further Arab prosperity and progress the British Government count on the cooperation of the Arabs chiefs. If any Arabs violate British territory and are so foolish as to join Turkish cause their hostility will be punished by force". (L/P&S/10/558, 23/11/1914.)

Accordingly the Abdali Sultan and other prominent chiefs in the Aden Protectorate had been informed by the Resident immediately after the action at Sheikh Sa'id took place, describing it as necessary owing to the menacing attitude of the Ottomans there, without harming the local Arabs with whom the British had no quarrel. (R/20/A/1319, 21/11/1914.) The Abdali Sultan who remained loyal to the British expressed his pleasure at the success of British action at Sheikh Sa'id. Further the Sultan informed Aden that he had also written to Ahmad Nu'man and other Arab-Ottoman officials assuring them that the British action at Sheikh Sa'id was occasioned by the menacing attitude of that fort towards British shipping. (L/P&S/10/558, 17/11/1914.)

In the meantime a concerted policy concerning action in the Red Sea had been discussed in London. On November 16, Sir George Clerk of the Foreign Office, Admiral Slade of the Admiralty, and Arthur Hirtzel of the India Office proposed to occupy Sheikh Sa'id, though the Ottoman post there had already been destroyed, arguing that it was necessary to occupy it to prevent a revival of the French claim; at the same time Kamaran, the Farasan islands and Hudaydah should also be occupied. Jacob, acting Resident, did not, however, agree to the proposal to occupy Hudaydah on the grounds that:

"... being a town on the mainland, as belying our assertion that we have no desire for extension of our territory. We proved by our abandonment of Sheikh Said, after the destruction of the fort, that we have no ulterior aim. A reply from Imam is still awaited by us, and if we occupy Hodeida, prior to its receipt, the Imam would misunderstand our action. Hodeida is the port for Sana'a, and generally for the territory of the Imam. Our plan, until it is proved futile, is to work against the Turks by Arab agency... promising them reasonable assistance and assuring them of our support after the conclusion of hostilities to secure autonomy. It was the Arab under Turkish lead who bore the brunt of the defence at Sheikh Said. I do not advocate occupation unless a further menace takes place. Kamaran is an island and belongs to Turkey and is connected with pilgrim traffic. Sanitary methods introduced there by Turks were very drastic and all Moslems would appreciate a change of hands. Farsan was formerly Idrisi's but it is now Turkish, and it is open to Government after the British flag has been hoisted there, to consider the advisability of restoring it to Idrisi". (L/P&S/10/559, 24/11/1914.)

All those proposals by Jacob were agreed by the Bombay Government. The Viceroy too agreed but not on the restoration of Farsan islands to the Idrisi. Concerning the operation at Sheikh Sa'id, Hardinge, the Viceroy, argued that "further until we know definitely the attitude of the Imam, Idrisi and Turkish Arabs generally, occupation of

Sheikh Said and Hodeida appears premature.... Unless therefore Turkish Arabs adopt definitely threatening attitude, I deprecate any action as regards Sheikh Said and Hodeida for the present". (L/P&S/10/558, 29/11/1914.)

However, towards the end of November 1914, a large force of Arabs were reported to have reoccupied Sheikh Sa'id. Consequently the new Resident, Major General D.G.L. Shaw, proposed to occupy it if the enemy attacked Perim, and this was initially agreed by the Viceroy. The India Office too were of the opinion that once the Ottomans were turned out from there the Arab could not be allowed to occupy it on their behalf. Later after he was informed that it was impossible to transport heavy guns by land to Sheikh Sa'id, the Viceroy opposed its reoccupation arguing it was unnecessary and undesirable not only because it would lock up troops there who were better employed elsewhere but it would also tend to irritate the tribes and render an isolated garrison at Sheikh Sa'id a greater source of anxiety than Perim now was. (L/P&S/10/558, 3/12/1914.) After receiving the views of the Government of India, the India Office, on the other hand, preferred to occupy it. They noted that this department remained of the opinion that sound policy would have been either preferably to have held Sheikh Sa'id when we took it from the Turks on November 10, or to have opened negotiations with the Arabs, before they have time to reoccupy it, or asking them to hold it in our behalf. (L/P&S/10/558, 5/12/1914.). However, they agreed with the Government of India that the present position now was unfavourable as there were no troops available. The plan to occupy Sheikh Sa'id was, therefore, dropped.

But when the India Office was informed of the presence of the Ottomans at Sheikh Sa'id, Crewe immediately telegraphed Hardinge to ascertain definitely whether the Ottomans were there or not. "If they are, and you cannot furnish troops, I will approach War Office though at present it might not be easy for them to detach any considerable force from Egypt". (Hardinge Papers 120, 11/12/1914.) Accordingly, Hardinge telegraphed London on December 13, informing him of a report from Aden that there were 300 Ottoman regulars and two to three thousand Arabs at Sheikh Sa'id in addition to 250 regulars and 1,000 Arabs in support at Mukha. However the action proposed by Crewe was not clear to the Viceroy as he stated "it is not clear what action your proposal should be taken: whether you mean a permanent occupation of that place or merely a raid such as lately made". (Adm 137/899, 13/12/1914.) The Viceroy did not agree to the former, not only because he certainly could not supply troops, but also due to the lack of drinking water, even if troops were found by Egypt. He instead preferred a raid as this he thought he might be able to carry out as five British Infantry Battalions including the Lancashire Fusiliers from Aden would rendezvous at or near Aden for next naval escort homewards on December 14. This force could be accompanied by part of the 23rd Pioneers from Aden for demolition work but the latter must at once return to Aden. Hardinge, however, did not see any permanent advantage which would be obtained from a raid unless there were really heavy guns to be destroyed and this he found difficult to believe. (Adm 197/899, 13/12/1914.)

The official in Aden was very curious about the military action taken against the Arabs as this could jeopardise the policy of avoiding jihad from the minds of the Muslims. The Resident did not agree with the proposal to attack Sheikh Sa'id arguing that:

“... from a political point of view if no reinforcement can be expected it is objectionable by attacking Sheikh Said to chance raising hostilities of Arabs in the Yemen because Turks were enabled by the last bombardment to take advantage of this to give Arabs to understand that British now clearly wished to annex Arabian soil and proclaim Jihad (jihad) against them. So far Arabs generally have not received Jihad (jihad) well... If we now attack without reinforcements having been sent to Aden, Protectorate will be rendered liable to attack by the Turks who will be probably be able to proclaim Jihad (jihad)”. (L/P&S/10/559, 13/12/1914.)

London, however, took a different view. In reply to Hardinge, Crewe explained that he was strongly opposed to the occupation of Sheikh Sa'id and nor did he approve a military raid similar to the last one which did not bring effective results. He, therefore, proposed to undertake a naval bombardment and to station a small warship at Perim to prevent any attempt to attack that place. (L/P&S/10/559, 13-14/12/1914.)

The alternative proposal from London did not change the views of the local authorities. Shaw, the Resident believed that a purely naval bombardment without combined naval and military action would not bring any definite result. (L/P&S/10/559, 15/12/1914.) The Admiralty agreed to the proposal of the Resident and were prepared to welcome a joint attack as apparently suggested by the Resident. (Adm 137/899, 18/12/1914.) Accordingly, due to the obstructive views of the Resident and the Viceroy, the India Office informed the admiralty that it was not expedient to take any aggressive action against the Ottomans at Sheikh Sa'id which would conflict with those views or with the policy they represented. (Adm 137/899, 22/12/1914.)

Conclusion

The British military operation at Sheikh Sa'id requires a second look. Bidwell and Baldry were of opinion that the operation was taken on a decision from London, and Aden was not consulted. This was obviously incorrect due to incomplete information available at the India Office. The political department at the India Office, London did not record any minutes or discussions on the proposed action at Sheikh Sa'id prior to the operation. It looks as if the India Office was not officially consulted. The War Diaries of the Government of India, on the other hand, contain full information about the plans at Sheikh Sa'id. From the War Diaries, it appears that discussions on the proposed plans at Sheikh Sa'id had taken place between the Viceroy, Hardinge, the Resident at Aden, Bell, Brigadier-General Cox who was in command of the operation, and Rear-Admiral Pierse, the Commander-in-Chief of the East Indies. The War Diaries, therefore, indicate that the plans were initiated by the Viceroy, and he instructed the Resident to keep the plans secret at Aden except for communication with Bradshaw whose cooperation in the execution of the operation was needed. The Viceroy further communicated with the Rear-Admiral Pierse in order to obtain the cooperation of the “Duke of Edinburgh” to escort and assist the operation on its way to Egypt. Records of the Admiralty finally provide a complete account of the operation at Sheikh Sa'id. From minutes and notes at the Admiralty the operation at Sheikh Sa'id was apparently taken without approval from

London notably from the Admiralty. The Admiralty was not even informed about the proposed operation, and initially believed after the action had taken place that the operation was carried out at the instance of the Resident at Aden and this was obviously incorrect.

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