Genocide Prevention in Modern Setting: Theory to Practice

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Abstract

Genocide is perhaps the most extreme and destructive crime against humanity, however, the international response to incidents of this nature has frequently lacked political will or commitment, either financially or through military interventions. A commonality in the lack of genocide intervention by individual states is the absence of gainful resources such as oil, gold and diamonds in the country of conflict, or through the description of such events as ‘civil wars’. A further problem encountered with the intervention of genocide is its legal classification, the limited meaning of which has consequently resulted in governments failing to respond whilst attempting to determine the correct ‘terminology’, with the recent conflicts in Darfur being a key example of this problem (Quayle, 2005). This article, therefore, attempts to determine whether genocide can be actively prevented through a discussion of the potential causal factors of genocide, and a critical evaluation of whether existing responses to genocide are both appropriate and effective.

The media of mass communications today include traditional printed newspapers, magazines and journals, as well as the 20th century’s core electronic resources: radio, television, and the Internet.

Keywords: Darfur, Genocide prevention.
Introduction

According to Lemkin (1944), the term ‘mass killing’ was inadequate in describing the true atrocities of the Holocaust (cited in Yacoubian, 2000) thus as a result, he devised the term ‘genocide’ from the ‘Greek ‘genos’ meaning race or tribe, and the Latin ‘cide’, meaning killing. The term was, thereafter, adopted by The United Nations Convention on the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG) in December 1948, making genocide a crime under international law (Alvarez & Bachman, 2008). Article II of the Convention defines genocide as any of the following acts committed with the intention ‘to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group: (a) Killing members of a group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group’ (Jones, 2006: 12-13). Not only is the act of genocide punishable, but also the conspiracy or the attempt to commit genocide, incitement to commit genocide, and complicity in the act of genocide (ibid). The UN’s decision to include the aforementioned four groups is based on the premise that such factors remain cognate to contemporary genocidal events (Quayle, 2005). A key criticism of the Convention’s definition is the problem of proving intent as perpetrators may deny there was an intention to commit genocide, arguing instead that the killing was a consequence of trying to defend their community or acquire land (Alvarez and Bachman, 2008). However, intention can be inferred indirectly from specific policies, governmental documents, and speeches (ibid). As debate has continued surrounding an absolute and applicable definition of genocide, various commentators have sought to offer alternatives as an attempt to overcome this issue, one such example being that of Katz (1994, cited in Jones, 2006: 18) who states; ‘[Genocide is] the actualisation of the intent, however successfully carried out, to murder in its totality any national, ethnic, racial, religious, political, social, gender or economic group, as these groups are defined by the perpetrator, by whatever means.’Although ‘the word is new, the concept is ancient’ (Kuper, 1981 cited in Jones, 2006: 3) and there are numerous examples throughout history of intentional mass killings of specific groups, for example, the total destruction of Carthage by Rome in 149 B.C. (Adler et al, 2004). According to Rummel (1994, cited Heidenrich, 2001: 8) 170,000,000 men, women, and children fell victim to genocide in the first 88 years of the twentieth century, thus ‘This is as though our species has been devastated by a modern Black Plague. And indeed it has, but a plague of absolute power and not germs’. Although most genocidal acts occur during periods of armed conflict, there is an important legal distinction between ‘war’ and genocide. Wars are supposed to involve only armed forces, and to preserve some civility, those involved in war must avoid harming non-combatants, which includes: ‘infants, children, women, the elderly, military physicians, medics and prisoners’ (Heidenrich, 2001: 1). By contrast, the victims of genocide include the defenceless, no matter how innocent or guilty they may be perceived to be, and is contrary to international law (ibid), however, Governments may fuse together war and genocide by employing trained military and militia for both purposes, thus further blurring this distinction (Markusen and Mirkovic, 1999 cited in Adler et al, 2004). What sets genocide apart from other forms of crime is the perpetrators have the legitimacy and authority of the government supporting their actions. This has led many academics to argue that the responsibility for the commission of genocide rests solely with the
leadership of the state who perpetrate it, as both formal and informal agents of the state are those who plan and perpetrate the genocidal acts themselves (Alvarez, 2001).

Genocide requires both planning and organisation, usually as a means to satisfy a goal of the governments, thus governments, or factions within a government, may generate resentment and prejudice toward a minority group in order to achieve this goal (Alvarez and Bachman, 2008), often through various propaganda campaigns.

It is vital that genocide is understood as a contemporary issue as well as one of historical significance, for example, England and Wales’ current political climate is, in many respects, comparable to that of Germany’s in the lead up to the election of the Nazi party, which can be seen in the rise in popularity of the British National Party (BNP). Whilst it is unlikely that this will lead to the occurrence of genocide in the UK, other cultural settings have witnessed such an escalation, for example the ongoing events in Darfur, and the recent conflict in Libya. Therefore, the aim of this dissertation is to determine whether genocide can be prevented, and this notion is explored through a range of debates: Section 2 illustrates the methodological approach taken for this research project, whilst exploring the strengths and weaknesses of both primary and literary data collection. Section 3 introduces the reader to the wider structural issues that surround the crime of genocide before discussing various theoretical approaches that attempt to explain the actions of perpetrators and bystanders.

Section 4 utilises genocide case studies from Rwanda and Bosnia, in order to demonstrate the various social, political, economic and criminogenic factors that precipitated these events. The chapter provides examples of some of the extreme incidents that took place, whilst also discussing the various interventions taken which facilitated the end of each of those genocides. Section 5 critically discusses the current approaches taken by the UN in preventing and intervening in genocide, before discussing alternatives to these measures suggested by various academics, governmental agencies, and charities. Finally, Chapter 6 considers future directions for the prevention of genocide; firstly to determine what will facilitate its success, and secondly, how likely this success will be.

Methodology

Many writers have pointed out the importance of genocide research for contributing to the understanding of the problem and, as Alvarez (2001: 2) argues, “turning the empty rhetoric of “never again” into a promise and a reality”. There is a clear responsibility for academics, including criminologists, to conduct research in this subject area in order to generate ongoing action and shape both national and international policy (ibid).

The approach taken for this research project is a literary analysis, utilising existing data in the format of books, journals, websites, documentaries and museum exhibitions. Primary research is not appropriate for this particular research project for many reasons, the first of which being that genocide is an extremely sensitive topic, both for survivors and those studying it. Jones (2006) states that those who investigate genocide can be impacted both psychologically and emotionally and such an approach may also cause distress to survivors through recalling genocide-related
events in their own lives. Yacoubian (2000: 14) summarises the limited use of traditional methods of criminological research when studying genocide, which include the issues that ‘field research presents physical dangers that make the standard problems of the method pale in comparison’ and the ‘use of unobtrusive measures is... hampered by... access to official records, and... language barriers’. He also states that the time needed to obtain reasonable familiarity with the history and culture of the study area is ‘unreasonable for most academics’ (ibid). In addition, the aim of the dissertation is to determine whether genocide can be prevented, however access to the relevant NGOs is problematic in this instance, therefore, literary analysis was deemed to be the appropriate research approach to adopt.

There are many advantages to using literary sources, such as free access to an increasing amount of documentary research with no permission needed (Noaks & Wincup, 2004) and the Internet, in particular, has helped to facilitate this. The data has more permanence which means it is available for others to check and as such, has a decreased likelihood of ethical problems (Denscombe, 2003). By comparing different sources of information, known as ‘data triangulation’, and using a number of theoretical positions through ‘theory triangulation’, the accuracy and validity of research improves (ibid), which would prove extremely difficult to attain through primary research in a project such as this. A technique most commonly associated with primary research is ‘snowball sampling’, where the researcher uses their initial sample group to establish contact with others, and so on (Bryman, 2008). This approach can be utilised in literary research where the bibliography from the source in use can also provide the opportunity to locate other such associated research. This was a crucial method in researching the Bosnian genocide as a case study, as much of the information initially located was based solely on legislation.

The most common sources of academic literature are books and journals, which offer the potential for in-depth practitioner knowledge on a given topic. Both must, however, be treated with caution in relation to the accuracy of their data, particularly if such publications are dated or are not peer-reviewed, whilst issues such as ‘Genocide’ are often not the focus for criminology-based publications.

**Explaining Genocide**

‘...most perpetrators of genocide are neither insane nor pathologically cruel. They are people like us’ (Stanton, 2007 cited in Waller, 2007: vii).

Genocide has been termed by Waller (2007) as an extraordinary evil, an understandable term by many. As a subject, genocide has been heavily researched throughout the latter part of the twentieth century in an attempt to discover the nature of this ‘extraordinary evil’. For the most part, academics have found that perpetrators of genocide are not psychopaths nor pathologically cruel, but are in fact ordinary people (Stanton, 2007 cited in Waller, 2007).

This chapter discusses theoretical explanations of perpetrator and bystander behaviour, as it is essential to understand the dynamics of these groups when attempting to prevent genocide. Stanton’s (1998) eight stage model of genocide is used to establish a structural understanding of the genocidal process as it is a useful basis for analysis. Each stage identified by Stanton
reinforces the others, with the first of the stages being ‘classification’. This refers to the human
tendency to identify some people as ‘us’ and others as ‘them’, for example the Nazi’s Nuremberg
Laws (ibid), however, this stage does not necessarily lead to genocide; only if cultural
boundaries are created is it possible (Stanton, 2008). The second stage is termed ‘symbolisation’,
where symbols are used to name and signify classifications, by referring to an ethnic origin or
physical characteristics, for example. At later stages of the process, governments often require
members of targeted groups to wear identifying clothing, such as yellow stars. The first two
stages are fundamental operations in all cultures, but when combined with dehumanisation, they
become steps of genocide (Stanton, 1998).

‘Dehumanisation’ is the third stage in the genocidal process, it is the denial of humanity, and can
involve labelling target groups as animals such as ‘cockroaches’, a term used for Tutsi’s by
extremist Hutus before and during the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Hate propaganda is used to
spread dehumanising ideologies such as this, and contributes to individuals overcoming the
normal revulsion felt against murder (Stanton, 1998; 2008). For Stanton (2008), stage four is
‘organisation’; plans are made for the genocidal killing, predominantly by the state, but
sometimes through militias or terrorist groups. The fourth stage can quickly spiral into the fifth,
which is ‘polarisation’, whereby groups are driven further apart by extremists who broadcast
extreme propaganda (ibid). Combined with this, killings committed by one group often provoke
revenge killings which can mark the beginning of mass murder (Stanton, 1998). Genocide
requires ‘preparation’, which is the sixth of Stanton’s eight stages. This stage includes
identification, often through identity cards such as the requirement for Rwandans to carry ID
cards identifying their ethnicity of Tutsi, Hutu or Twa, facilitating extremists’ easy identification
of victims. Seizure of property and belongings, and transportation of victims also occurs at this
time. The following stage is ‘extermination’; targeted groups are methodically and rapidly
murdered, and are not considered as murder as the victims have been successfully dehumanised.
The final stage is ‘denial’. Bodies are burnt or dumped into mass graves, victims are intimidated,
records destroyed, investigations into the crimes blocked and genocidal actions are denied,
claiming the deaths were a result of civil war (ibid).

As demonstrated, genocide is a process, with the turning point occurring at stages four and five;
however, the stages prior to these are fundamental in laying the foundations for genocide to
happen, known as ‘categorisation’. Within social psychology, there is a general consensus that
people tend to form close ties with members of their in-group, attributing unique features to the
individual members, while remaining suspicious of out-group members of whom they perceive
to share similar characteristics (Nelson, 2006; Fiske, 2002 cited in Nelson, 2006). Society is
reliant upon its members developing a sense of collective which promotes the importance of in-
group identity; however, these same values can facilitate hostility toward, and competition with
out-groups (Waller, 2007). Waller (2007) has commented that genocidal regimes have, in the
past, emphasised collectivistic values that are central to personal identity. He gives the example
of the collective identity in Rwanda prior to and during the 1994 genocide, for the Hutus held
their ideology to be resurrected from colonial and indigenous Rwanda, whereas they held Tutsi
to be an ‘alien’ and foreign race, and rejected any claim they had on Rwanda’s national identity
(ibid).
The mental process of ‘projection’ occurs when individuals perceive others as responsible for their misfortunes, and these ‘others’, or out-groups, are scapegoated as feelings of fear and anger are projected toward them (Allport, 1954). For example, in the wake of defeat in World War I, Germany suffered extensive food shortages and inflation, which was largely blamed on the Jews (Goldhagen, 1996). According to Frey and Rez (2002, cited in Waller, 2007), scapegoats provide a social explanation for being responsible for specific negative events and justification for the discrimination and violence initiated against them. Groups determine whether a minority group is disliked through generalising the link between the immediate frustrator and the disliked group (Berkowitz and Green, 1962). This hostility will also serve to strengthen solidarity within the group (Alvarez, 2001), and in turn ‘create a predisposition for group violence’ (Staub, 2002: 14). Scapegoating can provide ‘great psychological usefulness’ (Staub, 1989, cited in Waller, 2007: 218) as the perpetrator need not feel guilty about his or her actions against the group. However, in relation to Rwanda, Straus (2006) has rejected theories of deprivation and scapegoating. He found Rwanda’s perpetrators were poor, but were not on average any poorer than their neighbours, and points out that the violence did not begin in the poorest regions. Rather, Straus (2006: 232) comments that Rwandans feared punishment and so ‘calculated that compliance was less costly than opposition’. Furthermore, Straus (2006) argues that it is a setting of war and conflict that is necessary for ordinary men to kill, as it creates feelings of fear, anger, self-preservation and hostility which can create conditions for men to commit violence they might not in other circumstances. He states several other reasons for why war matters, firstly war settings legitimise killing; secondly war creates feelings of uncertainty and insecurity; and thirdly, war leads to the involvement of specialists in violence, namely gendarmes, militias and soldiers (Straus, 2006). Straus (2006) has emphasised the heavy influence of situational factors and the snowball effect of violence, as once a man becomes incorporated into the killing, he expects his peers to join him which results in large numbers participating.

Genocide Case Studies

Bosnia-Herzegovina

The Nazi’s annihilation of six million Jews made the Holocaust the ‘most shocking event of the twentieth century’ (Goldhagen, 1997: 4), however, it wasn’t just the sheer number of deaths at the hands of the Nazis that made the Holocaust so horrific. The scale of organization involved in implementing the Holocaust is an aspect that still shocks people today, for example the Nazi’s use of Auschwitz where tens of thousands of Jews, Poles, Gypsies and Soviets were murdered in purpose-built gas chambers (Imperial War Museum, 2000). Unfortunately genocide is not a crime of the past, as according to Harff (2003) there have been nearly 50 instances of genocide since World War II. This chapter utilises the more recent genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda to show the events precipitating each genocide, and the actions taken to reach the aims of the perpetrators.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

After WWI Bosnia united with other Slav countries to form Yugoslavia, which was essentially ruled by Serbs from Belgrade (Peace Pledge Union, 2011). The Serbs were divided between the
Chetniks, who supported a Serbian nationalist movement, and a political movement led by Josip Broz, known as Tito. There was widespread conflict between Tito’s forces and the Chetniks which led to thousands of Chetniks fleeing to neighbouring countries before and after Tito seized power in Belgrade, the Yugoslav capital (Jones, 2006). Yugoslavia was a multi-ethnic state consisting of six republics or regions; Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, with Serbia incorporating two autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina (Waller, 2007). As President of Yugoslavia, Tito crushed nationalism (BBC, 1995) and instituted a socialist state where Yugoslavs enjoyed freedom of movement and ethnic pluralism (Jones, 2006). Following Tito’s death in 1980, the multinational federation unravelled. Serbian nationalism re-emerged stronger when Slobodan Milošević became Serbian president in 1987, encouraging Serb nationalism in all states belonging to Yugoslavia (Peace Pledge Union, 2011). Prior to becoming President, Milošević visited Kosovo to meet and undertake talks with the local Communist Party leadership to calm ethnic tensions with bordering Albania (BBC, 1995; Jones, 2006). He was met with rowdy and disruptive Serbs and made no effort to halt the crowd, but instead encouraged their protest. By 1989, Milošević controlled half of Yugoslavia and ended Kosovo’s autonomy, marking the beginning of his campaign for a ‘Greater Serbia’ (ibid; Cigar, 2000).

Influential figures in Serbia began to shape a stereotypical image of Muslims being inferior and a threat to Serbian nationalism by highlighting the massacres of Serbs by Muslim Ustaše during WWII. This was a discourse that spanned much of Serbia’s leading political figures and intellectuals, and subsequently entered the state-controlled media in an attempt to fulfil the Memorandum’s goals. The re-emergence of various Chetnik organisations were promoted by Milošević at this time, and the Belgrade authorities funded militias set up by these organisations (ibid). Meanwhile, Franjo Tudjman led a nationalist political movement in Croatia supervising campaigns of harassment against the Serbian population (Jones, 2006), and was later voted in as President when Croatia gained independence from Yugoslavia in 1991 (BBC, 1995), triggering an ethnic war between Serbs, Muslims and Croats (Waller, 2007). In 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina was recognised as independent by the United States and European Union, however, the Bosnian-Serbs refused to accept the new government, which resulted in Milošević arming local Bosnian Serbs and beginning a wider war (ibid; BBC, 1995). According to the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadžić (cited in BBC, 1995), ‘Milošević didn’t care that the world recognised Bosnia’.

After a year’s conflict with Croatia, the Yugoslav Army, containing mostly Serbs, turned its attention to Bosnia (Peace Pledge Union, 2011). Neither the Muslim paramilitaries under the Bosnian president, Alija Izetbegovic, nor the Bosnian police were strong enough to fight the Serbs (BBC, 1995). Bosnian Serbs had set up their own Republika Srpska in Eastern Bosnia by the end of 1993, and a Bosnian Serb army led by Ratko Mladic was in control of three quarters of the country (Peace Pledge Union, 2011). Concentration camps were set up in the region of Prijedor in North-Western Bosnia, these included Manjaca, Keraterm, Trnopolje and Omarska (Helsinki Watch, 1993). The UN Commission of Experts (1994, cited in Srebrenica Genocide Blog, 2008) reported the main objective of the concentration camps, particularly Omarska, was to eliminate non-Serb leadership, and found non-Serbs in the Prijedor district were ordered to wear white arm bands to identify themselves. Omarska’s mine was converted into a detention
Omarska camp in early-1992 and contained up to two thousand prisoners. Helsinki Watch (1993: 108) stated the Omarska camp appeared to be the most brutal of the four camps in Prijedor, and quoted one of the prisoners saying: ‘We had three minutes to form a group of thirty, eat and get back to our room. Whoever didn’t make it would get beaten or killed… The stew we were given was boiling hot… so we all had “inside burns”. The inside of my mouth was peeling.’ The Omarska camp was discovered in July 1992 and forced to close due to international condemnation (Helsinki Watch, 1993).

The Bosnian town Srebrenica faced much of the wrath of the Serbs. By spring 1993, it contained 30,000 Bosnian Muslim refugees fleeing Serb assaults. Conditions in the town were poor, with overpopulation and resources dangerously low at all times. Although it was declared a ‘safe area’ by the UN’s Security Council on 16 April 1993, the Serb forces began a vicious attack on the town on 6 July 1995 despite the presence of UN troops. Over the following days, up to 8,000 unarmed Muslim men and boys were executed with military efficiency in local abandoned warehouses and factories, football fields and gymnasiums. The bodies were then bulldozed into mass graves across the area (Peace Pledge Union, 2011; Waller, 2007).

With the aim of ‘ethnic cleansing’, the Serbs systematically murdered Muslim civilians, including professionals, intellectuals and political leaders in a clear attempt to eliminate the Bosnian Muslim culture and create a Greater Serbia (Waller, 2007; World Without Genocide, 2010a). All sides of the war were guilty of instances of ethnic cleansing; however, the intensity at which the Serbs attacked the Muslims made it a clear genocide against the Muslim community. It has been estimated that 200,000 people lost their lives between 1992 and 1995 (ibid).

Prior to colonisation, Rwanda was a monarchical political system. Tutsis controlled the monarchy and were of higher social status, whereas Hutus were farmers of lower social status (Straus, 2006). Germany colonised Rwanda in 1894 (Jones, 2006) and used the pre-existing categories, and subsequently changed the significance and meaning of them, believing they had found a ‘superior’ ‘race’ in the Tutsis. After the Germans defeat in WWI, they were made to give colonial Rwanda to Belgium (Straus, 2006).

Belgian anthropologists ‘scientifically’ measured differences between Hutus and Tutsis, documenting Tutsis as ‘tall, elegant, light-skinned and thin-nosed’, and by contrast the Hutus were described as ‘short stocky, dark-skinned, and wide-nosed.’ Compulsory identity cards were introduced in the 1930s by Belgian colonial officers, which led ‘race’ to become a symbol of oppression. However, after WWII, Belgian administrations were under pressure from the United Nations to make reforms in their colonial rule, such as increasing Hutu political representation. The Tutsi elite resisted reform which radicalised the emerging Hutu counter-elite and hardened Belgian commitments to change. The ‘Hutu Revolution’ was in full swing when Rwanda gained independence in 1962, with a mixture of events occurring.

The Tutsi monarchy was overthrown and Grégoire Kayibanda was installed as Rwanda’s first President, the Rwandan government became dominated with Hutus purging Tutsis from their positions, and widespread violence against the Tutsis ensued.
In 1985 Tutsi nationalist exiles in Uganda formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) as a political group demanding the right to return to Rwanda. The rebels wanted an end to the discrimination against the Tutsi in Rwanda and subsequently invaded the country in October 1990 (World Without Genocide, 2010b). At the beginning of the civil war, Habyarimana did not consider the rebel attack to be a serious threat; however, he and his colleagues exaggerated the RPF threat and began to portray all Tutsi inside Rwanda as RPF collaborators in an attempt to gain back his lost popularity with dissident Hutu (Des Forges, 1999). The civil war lasted until 1993 when the Arusha Accords, a peace agreement, was signed by the rebels and the government which called for a ceasefire and an international peacekeeping force (UNAMIR) to assist the transition of government (Straus, 2006). Meanwhile, hate propaganda was published about the Tutsi in the newspaper ‘Kangura’ financed by one of Habyarimana’s financial advisors, Félicien Kabuga. In 1990, the Kangura published the Hutu Ten Commandments which were instructions to discriminate against the Tutsi, with the first three referring to Tutsi women. Kabuga was also president of Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) which began broadcasting one month before the Arusha Accords were signed. It has been argued that the radio station’s purpose was to prepare Rwanda’s citizens for genocide (Melvern, 2007) by reminding listeners of the colonial days and subsequently demonising the Tutsi (Panorama, 1997). Furthermore, Kabuga helped finance the Interahamwe, a militia group, and used his import company to purchase 987 cartons of inexpensive machetes from China in 1993 (Melvern, 2007; Rusesabagina, 2007). The Interahamwe began as the Mouvement Révolutionnire National pour la Développement’s (MRND) youth wing, and started their military training in early 1992 (Des Forges, 1999; Straus, 2006; Melvern, 2007). There was a second militia group named Impuzamugambi; however the Interahamwe were known to be the most effective throughout the genocide. During training, the Interahamwe were taught how to use explosives, handle weapons, and to kill efficiently by cutting the Achilles heel to prevent victims from escaping. Additionally, in the months prior to the genocide, Rwandans were able to buy Chinese-made grenades for three dollars and machetes for one dollar. By April 1994, it is estimated that there were approximately 30,000 militia members, all of whom had leaders at neighbourhood level (ibid; Rusesabagina, 2007). On 6 April 1994 President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down. A group of his close associates began the planned extermination of the Tutsi population which started with the killing of political opponents, including moderate Hutus. Prior to 6 April, lists had been drawn up of victims; these lists were used by the militias to drive victims from their homes to public sites, such as schools and churches, where they could be massacred in large-scale operations (Melvern, 2007; Des Forges, 1999). Administrative officials ordered locals to establish roadblocks to catch any Tutsi trying to flee, which were mostly broadcasted over RTLM (ibid). In the three weeks following Habyarimana’s death, approximately 20,000 people were killed in Kigali, this violence soon spread from the city to the countryside (Waller, 2007).

By mid-May the RPF were rapidly advancing through Rwanda putting pressure on authorities to order the final stage of the genocide. The aim was to exterminate all the Tutsi that had managed to hide thus far and those who had been protected by their status in the community. Moreover, they also sought to exterminate any survivors who may have been able to testify about the genocide (Des Forges, 1999). By this point the country was literally overflowing with corpses, thousands of which were disposed of in Kagera River floating downstream toward Lake Victoria causing a huge humanitarian crisis (Panorama, 1998). Kigali officially fell to the RPF on 4 July.
1994, and it has been estimated that between 800,000 and 1,000,000 people were killed over the 100 days of the genocide (World Without Genocide, 2010b; Waller, 2007). The Rwandan genocide was arguably the most efficient mass killing of the twentieth century, as Gourevitch (2000: 3) comments, ‘The dead of Rwanda accumulated at nearly three times the rate of Jewish during the Holocaust.’

**Eye Witnesses to a Genocide**

A world weary of catastrophic death, destruction and unparalleled human suffering following the Second World War and the horrors of the Holocaust, convened in San Francisco and signed the United Nations Charter in 1945—replacing the League of Nations (LON). The charter pledged that “[w]e, the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought sorrow to mankind….”1 Headquartered in New York, the United Nations comprises of six principal bodies, 191 members of the General Assembly and numerous satellite programs. The three most important principal bodies are the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretariat (its civil servants).2 The United Nations top priority according to Article 1 (1) is as follows:

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

International Criminal Tribunal For Rwanda has decided its final order: Life imprisonment for the minister of Rwandan women's affairs during mass destruction (1994) cut down to 47 years imprisonment.

69 year old convict has been in the prison of international tribunal for Rwanda when finally freed in 2011.

Tribunal for Rwanda and international criminal court for Yugoslav was replaced by international criminal tribunal mechanism.

**Genocide in Yemen & Palistine:**

Saudi Arabia and zionist regimes have been committing severe genocide in Yemen & occupied Palistine, without having any commitment to international rules being indifferent to the other states, impose their own false beliefs while presenting common stance called Saudi-Zionism. Saudi Arabian genocidal measures is considered as a crime against humanity and breach of international law. The incidence occurring in Yemen is thought to be an attempt to abort any lawful resistance against the cruelty in Arabian World, so as not to witness any progress in such regions.

Yemeni innocent children massacre along with hundreds of civilian genocide in the process of Ale Saood strikes reminds us to 51 day human catastrophe of Gaza.

The comparative analysis of Ale – Saud crimes in Yemen and those of Zionists in Gaza strait communicate a deep thought in human being's mind.
Acute current questions regarding the role of the media

The media do not make ideologically motivated genocide happen, but they facilitate and legitimate it. Low level Hutu perpetrators of the Rwanda genocide affirm that broadcasts by Radio Station RTLM affected their thinking in key ways. Even before the death of President Habyarimana, RTLM reinforced their fear of a Tutsi conspiracy to commit genocide against them, a fear amplified by reports of killings of Hutu civilians by the Rwanda Patriotic Front as it advanced into northern Rwanda. Following the death of the president, RTLM created an atmosphere legitimating the elimination of Tutsi through interviews with government officials and eminent Rwandans who identified all Tutsi as subversive supporters of the Rwandan Patriotic Front and its alleged plan to commit genocide against the Hutu. And RTLM created a background of pervasive, overwhelming hatred towards the Tutsi which discouraged ordinary Hutu from refusing orders to serve in well-organized patrols to hunt down and kill Tutsi.

For many of the ordinary Hutu perpetrators interviewed by Aaron Karnell, RTLM’s broadcasts made it appear as if all the authorities in the country urging the killing of Tutsi spoke with one voice. And while Karnell found that direct contact with local authorities rather than listening to RTLM was what immediately precipitated anti-Tutsi killing, he concludes that “RTLM played a critical reinforcing role in the effort of authorities to mobilize Hutu for violence. (Karnell thesis) Scott Strauss, after interviewing a very large sample of ordinary Hutu killers, reached similar conclusions. “The interviews I conducted suggest that the main effect of the radio broadcasts was to help establish killing Tutsis as the new order of the day—as the new ‘law,’ as the new basis for authority—after Habyarimana’s assassination and after the civil war resumed.” Thus, he concludes, “the radio broadcasts did not create that experience of insecurity, but likely contributed to it.” (Strauss, p. 281) Most of the ordinary killers interviewed by Strauss cited face-to-face mobilization as “a greater factor in their decision to take part in the killing than were radio broadcasts,” but, he found, “the radio broadcasts shaped the overall atmosphere in which the mobilization occurred and empowered the most violent killers.” (Strauss, Chapter 7 and Conclusion, p.387). Current field research in Rwanda makes it evident that broadcasts by RTLM facilitated and legitimated the Rwandan genocide of 1994. Preventing or stopping RTLM’s messages of hate would have seriously undermined the ability of its high level planners to carry out the mass mobilization required to carry out the systematic annihilation of Rwanda’s Tutsi.

Counter-genocide Measures

‘Genocide is a prime target for prevention because it is a man-made, not a natural, disaster’ (Fein, 2000: 42).
The UN’s Genocide Convention (1948) presents various strategies for the intervention and prevention of genocide. This chapter examines some of the measures enforced by the UN and its member states, whilst the cases of the Rwandan and Bosnian genocides are utilised to demonstrate the potential benefits and limitations of UN policy in practice. The latter part of the chapter discusses alternative preventive measures put forward by various NGOs and academics from the field of genocide-research, whose work largely focuses upon the ‘micro’ level, unlike the UN’s traditional ‘macro’ level approach.
The drafting of the UN Convention was not guided by any general theory of genocide thus Heidenrich (2001) identifies that this makes the conception of preventative measures problematic, whilst the Convention is also reliant on the potential deterrent effects of the threat of punishment via international law (ibid). Despite such criticisms, the UN may instate a range of measures to be employed before, during, and post genocidal incidents, one such option being the use of diplomatic pressure, which largely involves ‘negotiation, coercion, and clarification of intentions and reactions’ (Alvarez, 2001: 136). Diplomats will try to persuade state leaders to change policies considered to be ‘discriminatory’ and may also emphasise the serious potential implications for that government if such policies remain in place. Possible sanctions, as defined by the UN Charter, include the ‘complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations’ (Reismen and Antoniou, 1994 cited in Alvarez, 2001: 137). Alvarez (2001) suggests that because state leaders often attempt to conceal their intentions, international recognition and condemnation can have a positive impact on perpetrators of genocide, however, Warren Zimmerman (1996, cited in Heidenrich, 2001), the last of the old Yugoslav’s US ambassadors, has stressed the importance of force behind diplomatic pressure as without it, he suggests, those targeted may challenge the intent of the international community to intervene.

The UN often designates ‘safe havens’ or ‘safe areas’, however, these are not places for ‘normal’ life but instead, are places where the persecuted can go to survive (Heidenrich, 2001) and alongside peacekeeping forces, safe areas must also be consented to by the surrounding forces. Resolution 819 was adopted by the Security Council on 16 April 1993 demanding Srebrenica, in Bosnia, and all surrounding areas be treated as a safe area and be free from attack by all parties (United Nations, 1996), whilst the following month saw the adoption of resolution 824 which declared five additional safe areas in Bosnia (ibid). In all six cities, the UN Security Council demanded withdrawal of all paramilitary units, and to allow its peacekeeping force, United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), and international humanitarian agencies free access to all safe areas. The Council later authorized (via resolution 836) for UNPROFOR ‘to take necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas or to armed incursion into them or...deliberate obstruction to the freedom of...protected humanitarian convoys’ (United Nations, 1996). Despite this resolution, many of the humanitarian convoys’ supplies were raided en route to the safe areas, with little or no consequences, whilst the conditions of the safe areas were poor, with Srebrenica described as being overcrowded, grim and unsanitary (Heidenrich, 2001). The original plan for Srebrenica’s safe area included the presence of between 1,200 and 5,600 UN troops, however, the maximum number of soldiers reached only 510 at the beginning of March 1994, and Srebrenica was subsequently captured by Bosnian Serbs in July 1995. It has been estimated that 30,000 Muslims were expelled, or ‘ethnically cleansed’, from the safe area, and up to 8,000 Muslim men and boys were executed en masse (ibid), thus demonstrating the need for real commitment from member states to deploy the required number of troops to safe areas.

Conclusion/Future Directions

This article has demonstrated the complex nature of genocide, and the difficulty of implementing policy aimed to prevent and intervene in it. Genocide is the most devastating crime that anyone can participate in, however it is a crime that is under researched and understated.
As an international crime, genocide is a universal threat, for according to Alvarez (2001: 10) ‘more and more, it seems, genocide is the preferred method for destroying perceived enemies.’ Too often governments avoid intervention in genocidal crimes, as unfortunately, throughout history there have been few military interventions launched with the primary aim being to stop genocide (Heidenrich, 2001).

Chapter three demonstrated it is the situation that facilitates genocidal participation; thus, in order to prevent genocide on a micro level it is necessary to prevent genocide at the macro level. However, whilst the situation is to blame, most importantly it is the escalation of the situation that needs to be tackled; therefore, intervention needs to be early on in Stanton’s eight stages to prevent this escalation. Structural understanding of genocide can help facilitate its prevention (Stanton, 1998; 2008), for that reason education on risk factors and early warning signs are a vital starting point for every society. Stanton (1998; 2008) has suggested that universalistic institutions promoting tolerance, diversity and understanding can make a significant impact on preventing and halting the genocidal process. However, education may not work in all cases; for example, prejudicial feelings may be so deep-rooted that individuals remain adamant in their beliefs. This may be the case for past perpetrators who find it difficult to admit their wrongdoing, for it will mean having to deal with the consequences and guilt from their past actions. Although laws and policies can ban racism and prejudice, they may not always have the intended influence on society, for example Hans Friedrich (cited in BBC, 2005), an ex-SS officer, admitted to still having hatred toward the Jews calling it his ‘unshakeable conviction.’ Nevertheless, new laws and policies will eventually become the norm for the majority. Furthermore, Harff (2003) has argued that societies who have had previous genocides are three times more likely to be at risk of another in the future, therefore, it is vital to deal with the aftermath of genocide, through education, reconciliation and healing (Staub, 2000).

To date genocide intervention occurs at the latter stages of Stanton’s eight stage model, despite the other stages taking place. It may in fact be up to the international community to influence governments to intervene at earlier stages, as international condemnation can force governments into action; when Omarska camp was forced to close in July 1992 is just one example (Helsinki Watch, 1993). Failure to act appropriately can have disastrous effects not just for the country of genocidal origin, but neighbouring countries also. For example, the Hutu refugees from the Rwandan genocide, including many of the perpetrators, are currently in conflict with the Congolese army due to a fight over control of mineral mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo. As a result, the Congo has become infamous for being the ‘world’s most dangerous place for women’ (BBC, 2011). Arguably, if the Rwandan genocide had been dealt with appropriately by the UN and its member states, consequences such as this would not occur. Fundamentally, it is the problem of political will that must be addressed for genocide to be successfully prevented at present and in the future. A viable solution, suggested by Stanton (2008), would be to force national leaders to learn that they must stop genocides or face the consequence of being voted out of office by creating a world-wide movement to end genocide. Essentially, it is governments who have the power to commit genocide; therefore, it is governments who have the power to prevent it. National interests must not only focus on military and financial need, but the need of humanity, as all that is necessary ‘for evil to triumph...is...for good men to do nothing’ (Burke, 1729–1797 cited in Imperial War Museum, 2010).
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